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This paper provides a star comparison of manufacturing productivity levels in China, India,
Indonesia, South Korea and Taiwan with the US as the reference country for the period 1963-1993.
South Korea and Taiwan showed prolonged catch up in labour productivity with the US, whereas the
other countries had long periods of relative stagnation. This is reflected in relative performance of
seven detailed manufacturing branches. Physical capital per hour worked in the Asian countries is
still well below the US level and there are abundant opportunities for further capital intensification.
Relative total factor productivity levels in South-Korean and Taiwanese manufacturing are much
lower than in the US in all manufacturing branches. The same is true for India and Indonesia
compared to South Korea and Taiwan. Hence, late industrializers do not automatically benefit from
the increasing global pool of technologies.
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* I am grateful to Eddy Szirmai and Bart Verspagen for insightful discussions.2
1. Accumulationists and Assimilationists
Three decades of  impressive growth in East- and South-east Asia has attracted attention from
economists and policy makers alike. Boosted by the World Bank (1993) study The East-Asian
Miracle, a large body of literature attempts to explain the ‘miracle’. The debate centres around two
interrelated discussions. First of all, a huge controversy arose concerning the impact and desirability
of selective micro-economic interventions by national governments. Related to this is a more
quantitative discussion about the sources of rapid Asian growth: the total factor productivity (TFP)
debate. This second debate is the central focus of this paper. It will be argued that the discussion has
two flaws. First, the analysis of catch up and convergence is restricted to an aggregate economy level
(Kim and Lau 1994, Young 1995, Collins and Bosworth 1996). This might mask diverging trends at a
more desaggregated sectoral level (Bernard and Jones 1996). Therefore, this paper focuses on
productivity catch up and stagnation at the level of seven manufacturing branches. Secondly, we
provide comparisons of productivity levels, in addition to growth trends. Growth rates alone do not
tell to what extent productivity and capital intensity gaps still exist.
Krugman started the TFP-debate by popularising the findings of Young (1995) and Kim and Lau
(1994) in his famous, or rather infamous, article “The Myth of Asia’s Miracle”. Young found that
TFP growth rates  in East-Asia did not exceed those in advanced countries, and concluded that no
technological catch up has taken place. Instead,  East-Asian growth is simply explained by a rapid
increase in inputs through massive investment and once-and-for-all gains from increased labour
participation and improved resource allocation between sectors. In short, the so-called
accumulationists argue that the Asian miracle was based on “perspiration” rather than “inspiration”.
Growth was bound to slow down soon as Western levels of capital intensity are approached
(Krugman, 1994). The recent financial turmoil and its repercussions on growth in Asia seems to
support this analysis, at least at first sight.
Assimilationists like Nelson and Pack (1998) concede that East-Asian growth has been fuelled by
rapid growth of the physical and human capital stock.. However, they disagree with the conclusion
that “technical progress has played an insignificant role in post-war aggregate economic growth of
East Asian NICs” (Kim and Lau, 1994, p.264). The core of the disagreement between
accumulationists and assimilationists is the interpretation of the rapid increases in capital per worker
which took place. Following neo-classical theory, accumulationists interpret capital intensification as
an automatic and effortless shift along a well known global production function. Less developed
countries can adopt technologies practised at the world technology frontier without the need to devote
resources to the development of new technologies. In contrast, assimilationists stress the effort which
is necessary to master technologies which might not be new to the world, but are unknown to the
countries introducing them. Viewed this way, capital intensification is not a simple movement along a
prevailing production function, but a search for an enlargement of the set of production possibilities.3
Successful absorption of new technologies, and investigation of new products and new markets
requires a growing group of skilled workers and entrepreneurs who learn about and learn to master
new technologies already in use in more advanced countries.
This paper enlarges the empirical basis for the discussion between accumulationists and
assimilationists in two directions: by taking a more desaggregate view, and by providing international
comparisons of productivity levels, in addition to growth rates. Section 2 outlines the industry-of-
origin approach to international  comparisons as used in this study. For the period 1963-1993, a star
comparison of China, India, Indonesia, South Korea and Taiwan with the US as the reference country
is made. Relative labour productivity levels for aggregate manufacturing are presented in section 3.
South Korea and Taiwan showed prolonged catch up with the US, whereas the other countries had
long periods of relative stagnation.
Relative capital intensity levels in manufacturing are presented in section 4. Physical capital
per hour worked in the Asian countries is still well below the US level and there are abundant
opportunities for further capital intensification contrary to Krugman’s provocative suggestions. In
addition to the ‘object gaps’, there are also big ‘idea gaps’ as relative productivity in manufacturing is
found to be low in all Asian countries. This finding runs counter the argument that late industrialisers
can automatically benefit from the increasing global pool of technologies. The increased set of
production possibilities should enable latecomers to produce more productive than early
industrialisers given a particular level of capital intensity. This appears not to be the case neither for
Korea and Taiwan compared to the US, nor for India and Indonesia compared to the East-Asian
tigers. Opportunities offered by lateness are not easily seized as stressed by the assimilationists.
Turning to manufacturing branches, section 5 shows that catch up or relative stagnation of
labour productivity in aggregate manufacturing is reflected in relative performance of most branches.
However total factor productivity trends differ considerable between branches. Hence, aggregate
studies mask important divergent trends at a more detailed level. Section 6 provides a discussion of
possible explanations for relatively low productivity in Asian manufacturing.
2. Industry-of-origin Approach to International Comparisons
The international comparisons of levels and trends in productivity in this paper are based on star
comparisons with the US as the reference country. We make use of published and ongoing work in
the International Comparisons of Output and Productivity project (ICOP)1 from Szirmai and Ren
(1998) on China, Timmer (1999b) on India, Szirmai (1994) on Indonesia, Pilat (1994) on South
                                                     
1 Since 1983 a substantial research effort has been undertaken to carry out industry of origin comparisons of
sectoral output and productivity across countries. The International Comparisons of Output and Productivity
(ICOP) project was initiated by Angus Maddison. The ICOP project now covers about 30 countries in Asia, East
and West Europe, and North and South America. Information about ICOP can be obtained at
http://www.eco.rug.nl/ggdc/icop.html.4
Korea and Timmer (1998) on Taiwan. In the ICOP project, comparative levels and trends in labour
productivity are derived as follows.
a. First, national labour productivity figures for a given benchmark year are put on a similar
conceptual basis by adjusting all countries to conform to a common definition of value added and
employment, and a common industrial classification.
b. Second, value added in local currency in the benchmark year is converted to a common currency
using binary purchasing power parities at producer prices, so called unit value ratios (UVRs).
UVRs are estimated with the industry-of-origin method for international comparisons as used and
refined in the ICOP project.
c. Third, the benchmark comparison of real labour productivity is extrapolated forwards and
backwards through time, on the basis of national time series of employment and value added in
the countries being compared.
The basic data sources for the calculation of industry-of-origin UVRs are the manufacturing censuses
of the different countries. These contain product level data on quantities and output values, allowing
for calculation of unit values for each item or group of items. On the basis of a binary product
matching procedure between each Asian country and the reference country in this paper, the USA,
product level UVRs are derived.2 These UVRs are subsequently aggregated into higher level UVRs
by a stepwise weighting procedure. As the structure of production differs from country to country,
two aggregate UVRs are calculated, one at country weights of the Asian country (Paasche index), the
other at country weights of the reference country, the USA (Laspeyres index). The Fisher averages of
the two UVRs are used as a summary measure. The UVRs are used to convert value added in a single
deflation procedure.3
For the purpose of comparisons by branch of industry, industry-of-origin UVRs are preferable to the
expenditure-based purchasing power parities (PPPs) as derived in the International Comparisons
Project (Kravis, Heston and Summers, 1982). Expenditure PPPs are based on prices of final goods
and thus include not only indirect taxes and transport and trade margins, but also the prices of
imported goods, while excluding the prices of exported goods. Even when the expenditure PPPs are
corrected for such factors, the problem remains that PPPs refer only to final products. Branches
producing intermediate products like textiles, basic metals, pulp, wood products etc. will therefore
not be covered by these final product PPPs (Jorgenson and Kuroda, 1990; Hooper and Vrankovich,
1995).4
                                                     
2  The number of product matches made in each binary comparison varies from 67 for China/US to 214 for
Indonesia/US.
3   Ideally, double deflation is preferable but data on input unit values are insufficiently available. See for a more
detailed description of the ICOP industry-of-origin approach Maddison and van Ark (1988) or van Ark (1993).
Timmer (1996) provides a statistical reinterpretation of the ICOP approach as a stratified sampling approach.
4 See van Ark (1996) for an elaborate discussion.5
Table 1 provides the Fisher UVRs for total manufacturing used in this paper. They are compared with
ICP PPPs for total GDP and the official exchange rates. The UVR for total manufacturing is higher
than the PPP for GDP, which is a common finding in ICOP studies of developing countries. The GDP
PPP also includes relative prices of services which are generally much lower in developing countries
than in developed countries. The exchange rate deviates considerably from the UVR and is
consistently higher. Relative price levels range from 49% in the case of China/US up to 85% in the
case of Korea/US.











China/US (1985) 1.45 0.79 2.94 49
India/US (1983) 8.08 3.06 10.31 78
Indonesia/US (1987) 1,200 417 1,644 73
South Korea/US (1987) 700 474 823 85
Taiwan/US (1986) 29.7 23.3 35.5 84
a Relative price level is defined as the Fisher UVR divided by the exchange rate times 100.
Sources: Manufacturing UVR for China/US from Szirmai and Ren (1995); India/US from Timmer
(1999b); Indonesia/US from Szirmai (1994); South Korea/US from Pilat (1994); Taiwan/US from
Timmer (1998). GDP PPP and exchange rate from PWT 5.6 (see Summers and Heston, 1991).
Taiwan PPP updated from Yotopoulos and Lin (1993).
3. Relative Productivity Levels in Manufacturing
For productivity measurement, consistency in the population of firms surveyed for data on both input
and output is an essential prerequisite. Therefore we chose to take series on output and employment
from one and the same source. Preferably these series are taken from the national accounts (in case of
the US), or from manufacturing surveys, when consistent desaggregated national accounts series are
not available (China, India, Indonesia and Korea). Only for Taiwan we were forced to use a
combination of national accounts and survey data.
Manufacturing survey data in developing countries often covers only medium and large scale
firms. In Indonesia, establishments with less than 20 employees, and the oil refining and liquid
natural gas industry, are excluded from the survey. In India, establishments with less than 20
employees using no power, or establishments with less than 10 employees using power, are not
covered. The Chinese census covers only enterprises with independent accounting systems at
township level and above.5 For these countries time series covering all manufacturing firms are not
available. Note that this introduces an upward bias in labour productivity and capital intensity levels6
relative to the other countries studied. For South Korea and Taiwan, the figures in this paper do refer
to all manufacturing firms.
Table 2 presents levels of value added per worker relative to the USA for the period 1963-1993 using
the industry-of-origin approach. The studied economies clearly fall into two categories: South Korea
and Taiwan on the one hand, and China, India and Indonesia on the other. In 1963, Korean and
Taiwanese labour productivity was 7%, respectively 11%, of that in the USA. In three decades, the
Korean labour productivity relative to the US went up to 49% in 1993. In the same period, the
Taiwanese level went up to 31%. In China, India and Indonesia, labour productivity was less than
11% of the US in 1993.6
Table 2  Gross Value Added per Worker and per Hour Worked




a  Korea Taiwan US
A. per worker
1963 7.5 7.2 11.8 100.0
1975  
b 6.3 7.2 9.2 16.5 19.3 100.0
1987 5.7 8.4 8.1 26.5 26.6 100.0
1993  







B. per hour worked
1963 6.0 5.1 8.2 100.0
1975 6.0 6.9 12.0 13.7 100.0
1987 4.9 6.8 6.3 18.4 20.4 100.0
1993 8.8 8.0 35.8 24.9 100.0
a Chinese, Indian and Indonesian figures have incomplete coverage see section 3; 
b 1980 ; 
c 1992.
d Semi-logarithmic trend growth rate for 1963-1993, except Indonesia for 1975-1993, at 
* 90% or 
***
99% significance.
Source: Updates and  revisions as described in Timmer (1999b) of original studies for China/US from
Szirmai and Ren (1995); Indonesia/US from Szirmai (1994); South Korea/US from Pilat (1994) and
Taiwan/US from Timmer (1998).
Table 2 also shows the semi-logarithmic catch up growth rate by regressing the natural logarithm of
relative labour productivity on time (ln yt = a + b t). Little stars indicate whether the trend growth b
                                                                                                                                                                    
5  For this sector, no single cut off point in terms of establishment labour force size can be given, but the
average employment size of enterprises not covered by the census is six workers per establishment (Szirmai and
Ren, 1998, Table A.2).
6  In 1990, adjusting for small scale establishments, labour productivity in China and Indonesia was about 5% of
the US level, while the Indian relative level was only 2% (Timmer 1999b).7
differs significantly from zero, that is, whether catch up or falling behind has taken place. In Korea
and Taiwan rapid catch up has taken place at respectively 6.1 and 2.9 per cent per year. In contrast,
the Chinese census sector has significantly fallen behind during 1980-92. In Indonesia, the medium
and large scale sector experienced little catch up at 0.6 per cent per year, and all of this took place
since 1989. In India, the registered sector caught up at 1.1 per cent per year during 1963-1993, but it
was relatively stagnant during the 1960s and the 1970s. One could characterise the experience of
these countries in the earlier periods as rapid growth without catch up. Graph 1 illustrates the catch
up and stagnation patterns of the Asian countries.
Graph 1 Relative Labour Productivity Levels














































    Source: See Table 2.
In panel B of Table 2 the labour productivity comparison is put on an hourly basis. Hours worked per
worker in Asian manufacturing are much higher than in the USA. Hence relative value added per
hour is much lower than value added per worker. Taiwanese and especially Korean economic
development is still based in part on exceptionally long working hours. The differentials between the
Asian economies become smaller, as hours worked in Chinese, Indian and Indonesian manufacturing
are lower than in the other Asian economies.
4. Relative Capital Intensity and Efficiency Levels in Manufacturing
The relatively low levels of  labour productivity in the Asian countries are of course partially caused
by less capital intensive production due to lower wage-rental ratios. Therefore, in this section we
present estimates of relative capital intensities in the manufacturing sector. Capital stock estimates8
are inherently difficult to make and different approaches to their measurement are used. This is the
main determinant of the widely diverging rates of TFP growth which have been estimated for Asian
countries (Chen 1997, Felipe 1997). In this paper, gross fixed capital stock is estimated using the
perpetual inventory method (PIM) for all countries. Essentially, a capital stock estimated by PIM is a
summation of past gross investment flows. Each year new real investment is added and capital which is
assumed to have been worn out after its service life time is discarded. We assume that repair and
maintenance will keep the physical production capabilities of an asset constant during its lifetime
(rectangular survival distribution).7 Investments are taken from manufacturing surveys in the case of
India and Indonesia, and from the national accounts in the case of South Korea and Taiwan. For Chinese
manufacturing, no reliable investment series exist. Table 3 shows the estimates of capital per worker in
the four Asian countries relative to the US.
In 1993, workers in Indian and Indonesian manufacturing had about 23% of the capital per worker in
the US at their disposal. In Indonesia, relative intensity shows a declining trend since 1975. The
investment boom triggered by the opening up of the Indonesian economy in 1986 has been
accompanied by a huge labour influx mainly in the labour intensive export industries. Indian relative
intensity levels have shown no significant catch up for three decades (1963-93). In both South Korea
and Taiwan relative capital intensity levels have rapidly increased at about 5 per cent per year. Catch
up took place from very low levels in the sixties, and in 1993 the gap with the US is still far from
closed. In 1993, capital stock per hour worked in Korea is 62% of the US, while 38% in Taiwan. This
indicates that abundant opportunities for further capital intensification and catch up still exist,
contrary to the suggestions of accumulationists.
Table 3 Capital Intensity in Total Manufacturing, 1963-1993 (US = 100)
India
a Indonesia
a Korea Taiwan US
A. per worker
1963 19.3        15.8          8.5 100.0
1975        17.0        30.1        21.0        22.4 100.0
1987        20.1        21.8        44.0        29.9 100.0






B. per hour worked
1975 14.2        22.7        15.3        15.8 100.0
1987        16.1        16.9        30.6        22.9 100.0
1993 18.4        17.8        61.7        37.7 100.0
a  Indian and Indonesian figures have incomplete coverage see section 3;
b Semi-logarithmic trend growth rate for 1963-1993, except Indonesia for 1975-1993.
Significance at 
* 90% or 
*** 99% level.
                                                     
7 See Timmer (1999a) for details of estimating capital stock in Indonesian manufacturing.9
Graph 2 provides an insightful analysis of the productivity with which capital is used. It traces the
historical relationship between capital intensification and labour productivity for the US and the
Asian countries, all expressed in 1985 US dollars. The paths for Korea, Taiwan and the US in panel
A show that capital intensity has been steadily increasing through time (except for some temporary
setbacks in the US). As expected, the relation between capital intensification and labour productivity
is positive for all three countries. The graph reinforces the fact that large gaps in capital intensity still
exist. In 1993, capital per hour worked in Taiwan manufacturing was lower than in the US in the
early sixties, and Korea had not yet surpassed the level in US manufacturing in 1975.
The permanent ‘lead’ of the US over South Korea and Taiwan in graph 2 is also interesting. This
indicates that the US manufacturing sector generated much more output per hour worked in the past,
when using the same amount of capital per hour worked as in South Korea and Taiwan today. The
finding indicates that developing countries do not automatically benefit from the increasing global
pool of technologies. As the world technology frontier shifts because of innovations and maturing of
older technologies, South Korea and Taiwan today have a much larger set of technologies to choose
from than the US in earlier times. The advantages to backwardness are portrayed in the possibility for
less developed countries to adopt these technologies without the need to devote resources to the
development of these technologies themselves (Gerschenkron 1952). Hence, one would expect that
South Korea and Taiwan today could generate at least as much output as the US in the past with the
same amount of capital per hour worked. However, productivity is much lower as indicated in graph
2 and consequently technologies do not spill over automatically as stressed by assimilationists. The
graph  shows that South Korea and Taiwan today still lag behind the technological level in US
manufacturing of at least more than two decades ago. Note that one does not need to invoke the
concept of a production function for this interpretation. By comparing South Korea, Taiwan and the
US at different points in time but at similar capital intensity levels, one abstains from the troublesome
decomposition of technical change and capital intensification which is so much criticised by
assimilationists (Nelson 1973).
In graph 2B the development paths of India and Indonesia are traced and compared with the early
experience of Taiwan and Korea at a per worker basis. In the same way as South Korea and Taiwan
were outperformed by the US, India and Indonesia are outperformed by Korea and in particularly
Taiwan. This is true for all capital-labour combinations explored in India and Indonesia. When in the
past the Taiwanese manufacturing sector operated at intensity levels used in India and Indonesia
today, labour productivity was much higher. Again, the increased set of production possibilities
should enable India and Indonesia to be more productive than Taiwan and Korea. It can be concluded
that the opportunities offered by lateness are not easily seized. We will return to possible reasons for
the found low productivity in Asian manufacturing compared to the US in section 6.10
Graph 2 Capital Intensity versus Labour Productivity in Manufacturing
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5. Catch up and Stagnation in Manufacturing Branches
Aggregate patterns of manufacturing catch up and relative stagnation may be mirrored by similar
movements at a more desaggregated level, or may mask diverging trends. To see whether this is the
case, we estimated relative labour productivity for seven manufacturing branches for 1963-1993 in a
similar way as we did for aggregate manufacturing using branch specific unit value ratios. The results
are presented in Table 4. Catch up trends for the period under consideration are given as well. They
are either significantly positive (+) or negative (-), or insignificant (0). As our focus is on long term
trends, we take 3-year averages to smooth out business cycles which are more visible at a detailed
level of analysis than at the aggregate level of the previous section. Looking at the rows of the most
recent years for each country in table 4, one may conclude that the general level of labour
productivity in the manufacturing sector is reflected in the relative performances of its various
branches. In all branches, relative labour productivity is much higher in Korea and Taiwan than in
China, India and Indonesia.8 Even so, also in Korea and Taiwan gaps with the US still exist,
especially in food manufacturing.
In the sixties, all manufacturing branches in Korea and Taiwan started from very low relative levels
of labour productivity. Aggregate catch up during 1963-1993 is reflected in significant catch-up
tendencies in all seven branches. Catch up in the machinery and metal branches are particularly
noteworthy. In China, five out of the seven branches show significant falling behind in labour
productivity levels between 1980-92 as does aggregate manufacturing. Especially in the textile
branch the decline is dramatic. Only food manufacturing shows clear catch up. In India, the catch-up
trend in aggregate manufacturing is mirrored by developments in the four capital intensive branches.
The three traditional light branches show insignificant trends in relative labour productivity. In
Indonesia, five branches participate significantly in catch up while chemicals and electrical
machinery show a modest, but significant decline in relative labour productivity.
                                                     
8 Note that the data for China, India and Indonesia covers only medium and large scale firms. This introduces an
upward bias in labour productivity relative to South Korea, Taiwan and the US. At a branch level, the bias is
important for labour intensive traditional activities such as manufacturing of wood products, wearing apparel and
leather, but the bias is negligible for large scale modern industries like chemicals, basic metals and electrical
machinery.12
Table 4 Gross Value Added per Worker
















China, IAE at township and above
1980-82 6.2  11.9  7.4   12.2   3.6  10.4 4.3  6.4












1963-65 5.2    17.1      8.1  9.9  10.7   8.6  11.7    7.4
1977-79  3.3    14.0      8.1  9.0  13.6  8.4   7.2   7.3









Indonesia, medium and large scale sector
1977-79 6.6  11.4  10.4  9.6  13.7  27.5      7.2      8.6













1963-66 5.2    8.8  7.2  7.8  3.8     9.5      4.8      7.1
1977-79  11.1   24.6    22.4    27.4  24.0    16.6    10.9    18.0













1963-65 7.3    16.8  23.5  5.4  4.4    10.3      8.5    12.8
1977-79     10.8    40.4  29.6  20.3  20.3    20.4    18.9    21.9

















b Coefficient of variation based on results for thirteen branches.
Source: Timmer (1999b)
One might conclude that in general the catch up process in all economies is broad based and not
limited to a small number of  branches, just as falling behind in China appears to be a manufacturing
wide phenomenon. This pattern is consistent with the notion of conditional convergence. The13
conditions for less developed countries to catch up with more advanced countries are typically not
branch specific. Conditions mentioned in the literature range from education and schooling activities
to the removal of institutional and socio-cultural barriers to the acquisition and diffusion of new
technology (Abramovitz 1989, Barro 1991). These forces all operate at the economy-wide or
manufacturing level, and much less so at branch level.
Using PIM estimates of capital stocks in a neo-classical production function framework, an indication
of relative total factor productivity levels can be given. Relative TFP levels have been calculated first
for a benchmark year using a Cobb-Douglas production function with constant returns to scale. The
benchmark is extrapolated using national Tornqvist indices of TFP. The results are given in Table 5.
It shows that in all countries and all branches, productivity has been, and still is, much lower than in
the US. Only in Korea do all branches show sustained catch up in TFP during 1963-1990, but in the
latest period productivity is still 60% of the US or below. In Taiwan there is relative stagnation at the
aggregate manufacturing level from 1963 to 1993. However, only in the chemical sector a relative
decline is recorded, while the food sector is stagnating. The other five branches all show significant
catch up to 60% of the US level in the beginning of the 1990s. For Taiwan, the aggregate outcome
does mask substantial variation in movements of relative branch TFP, unlike we found for labour
productivity. The same is true for India and Indonesia. Relative TFP stagnation in aggregate
manufacturing in India during 1973-93 is the result of counteracting small increases and decreases in
relative branch TFP. In Indonesia, strong catch up is found for four branches during 1975-93.
However, relative efficiency in the chemicals branch, and to a lesser extent in the electrical
machinery branch, has declined. Hence there appear to be branch specific sources of relative TFP
improvements.
If one adheres to the neo-classical interpretation of relative TFP as the relative level of technology9,
our findings suggest that the accumulationists are wrong in suggesting that no or only modest
technological change has taken place in Asia. The aggregate level of analysis taken in most studies,
such as Kim and Lau (1994) and Collins and Bosworth (1996), masks important differences in
sectoral movements within the Asian countries. Looking at the manufacturing sector in Korea, TFP
growth rates are particularly high, as also found (but not stressed) by Young (1995). This catch up
trend is reflected in detailed branch performance. In Taiwan, manufacturing as a whole does not show
catch up in TFP with the US, but this is caused by a severe falling behind of the chemicals sector and
stagnation in food manufacturing, while all other branches show significant catch up trends. Also in
India and Indonesia there are branches which fall behind, coupled with other branches which show
clear increases in their relative level of technology.
                                                     
9 At best, TFP only measures disembodied technological change, at worst it is nothing more but a measurement
residual including scale effects, changes in technical and allocative efficiency, changes in the quality of inputs,
changes in utilisation rates, structural change and the like (Chen 1997).14
Table 5  Total Factor Productivity

















1977-79 16.2   25.6   23.4   16.0   24.2   14.7   15.9   16.9









Indonesia, medium and large scale sector
1977-79 13.7   19.2   34.6   26.3   23.9   50.6     9.5   17.7












1963-66   16.3   22.8   24.1   32.3   11.4   34.3   11.8   21.6
1977-79   24.1   42.9   54.8   42.0   37.1   39.8   23.2   36.4













1963-65   23.9   39.0   85.7   29.3   10.3   33.1   22.0   40.2
1977-79   19.0   51.8   66.5   39.6   31.4   39.3   33.3   39.8















b Coefficient of variation based on results for thirteen branches.
Source: Timmer (1998b)
Table 6 gives alternative evidence for the important technological changes that have taken place in
the Asian countries. Table 6 shows the number of goods of which production started before, or after,
1970. It shows that since 1970 the Asian countries rapidly increased the range of product
technologies in use as the number of consumer, intermediate and capital goods produced has
increased dramatically. The diversification of activities, including a shift towards higher technology
products, is surely a sign of the process of technological upgrading that has taken place in these
countries. The accumulationists’ dictum that technical progress has played an insignificant role in
Asian growth is readily dismissed.15
Table 6 Scope of Industrial Activities in Four Asian Countries, 1970 and 1987
Consumer goods Capital goods Intermediate goods
1970 1987 1970 1987 1970 1987
China 10 36 1 17 23 49
India 29 47 16 21 57 74
Indonesia 36 63 1 6 18 43
South Korea 49 63 12 31 39 78
Note: Column 1970 gives the number of  goods of which production started before December 1970.
Column 1987 gives the number of  goods of which production started inbetween January 1971 and
December 1987. In total 83 consumer good categories, 43 capital good categories and 107
intermediate good categories are distinguished.
Source: UNIDO (1990) Industry and Development, Global Report 1990/91, Table 1.4.
6. Climbing the Technology Ladder: How Fast Can You Go?
On the basis of the results presented in this paper, one may conclude that the TFP-debate has been
misdirected. First of all, capital intensities in the Asian economies are still much lower than in the
US, and opportunities for further intensification are abundant. Secondly, studies have been performed
at too aggregate a level. Looking at detailed manufacturing branches, it has been shown in this paper
that a number of branches in all countries do show significant catch up with US TFP levels, while
other branches do not. Aggregate studies mask substantial divergence at a more detailed level.
Moreover, product level evidence shows that the number of technologies in use in the South and
East-Asian countries have increased dramatically over the past three decades.
Consequently, the TFP-debate between accumulationists and assimilationists should not be
about whether or not technological change in Asia has taken place. Assimilationists are right to stress
that technological change did take place. All the same, accumulationists have a point in arguing that
there is a problem nevertheless as TFP levels are particularly low in the Asian countries. If one does
not accept the possibility of seperating factor substitution and technological change, or TFP, as
assimilationists are wont to do (the identification problem, Nelson 1973), it still remains to be
explained why the level of output per worker generated in Taiwanese and Korean manufacturing
today is much lower than that generated in US manufacturing when it was operating at the same
levels of capital intensity at least two decades ago. In the same way India and Indonesia operate
today at capital-labour ratios which were used in Taiwan and Korea in the seventies, but labour
productivity is much lower. Big idea gaps still exist between these countries. This runs counter the
idea that latecomers can costless choose from at least as large a pool of technologies as earlier
industrialisers. This result is surprising, giving that the use of manufacturing technologies is generally
much less sensitive to particular country’s social and physical circumstances than for example
agricultural technologies (Evenson and Westphal, 1995). Moreover, opportunities for global diffusion16
of manufacturing technologies are high given the flows of foreign investment and competitive
pressures from international trade.
On average, firms in South- and East-Asia are still predominantly engaged in lower technology
activities and products which might generate less output per unit of input than activities of US firms.
This is a convincing argument for explaining the relative inefficiency of the countries today
compared with the US today, but less so when they are compared with the US in the past as in this
study. Many of the pioneering technologies used in the US in the past are now matured and used in
developing countries. It is not clear why these technologies are operated with lower productivity. Part
of it might be due to the very fact that the technologies in use in developing countries are mature and
used in a international competitive market. Hence the room for mark-up pricing of output is much
more limited than it was for the US in the past.
A more convincing argument is that the growth of the “soft” component of investments, which
includes managerial methods and information, lags behind the “hard” component in rapid growing
countries. Automation in the manufacturing sector is increasingly shifting beyond the level of
transformation (machine co-ordination) to transfer (system co-ordination). This will increasingly
require advances in organisational techniques. Domestic diffusion of knowledge and new
technologies is inadequate in many developing countries as suggested by Pack (1987) and Pack and
Westphal (1986). Together with a lagging development of the institutional environment, the financial
system and infrastructural services the full potential productivity of capital goods might not be
realised. The recent Asian financial crises illustrates the detrimental effects of an uneven
development between the soft and hard components of investment.
A more evolutionary explanation stresses the very nature of climbing the technology ladder and the
role of learning. Shifting resources to new products or new production processes has both a static
level and a dynamic growth effect on productivity. The dynamic effect of technological change is
often linked to learning by doing. In the 1930s, Kuznets and Burns, studying US economic growth,
found that output growth rates of particular products or industries were almost invariably subject to
retardation.10 This was attributed to diminishing possibilities for further productivity improvements
as production and experience accumulates (bounded learning by doing). Hence new technologies will
have higher productivity growth than more mature technologies, and only a continuous appearance of
new industries and technologies prevents aggregate productivity growth to decline.
At the same time the shift to new technologies has a static effect on TFP levels. The direction
of this effect is unclear. In the context of trade liberalisation, neo-classicals argue that the induced
resource shift according to comparative advantage has a positive static effect by improving allocative
efficiency. But there is abundant evidence that the introduction of new technologies invariably
involves “set-up” costs associated with adaptation and adjustment problems and consequently
                                                     
10  Abramovitz 1989, p.30 vv.17
inefficient use, at least in the starting phase.11 Hence the TFP level of the newly introduced
technology might well be lower than the technologies already in use. However, if there exist learning
spill-overs between technologies, besides technology specific learning effects as described above,
part of the cost components will return in externalities.
According to this ‘model’ of climbing the technology ladder, low TFP growth arises in two
situations: by climbing the technological ladder too slowly, or too fast. In the first case, it becomes
progressively harder to achieve equal productivity gains with the same technologies, and growth will
slow down. In the second case, the premature movement up the technological ladder results in fast
productivity growth in new industries which displace each other rapidly. However, in the aggregate
this is more than counteracted by the decline in the level of TFP each time a new industry is entered
and (localised) learning has to start all over again.  Young (1992) suggest that this is the case for
Singapore which fell victim to its own ambitious targeting policies. And many others fear that
Indonesia’s leapfrogging into aeroplane development has similar negative effects. Whether a country
is climbing too slow or too fast is hard to assess, and certainly deserves a detailed sectoral analysis.
As a short cut, one might argue that long term success in a competitive export market is a better judge
than TFP measurement. In that respect, East-Asia’s industrialisation has been fast, but certainly not
too fast.
                                                     
11 This is the standard argument for infant industry protection.18
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